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CURTAILING TAX TREATY OVERRIDES: A CALL TO ACTION
Anthony C. Infanti"

It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in
the time of Henry IV.
INTRODUCTION

During the past quarter-century, Congress has "taken an increasing
interest in the formulation and reformulation of tax policy, including the tax
rules applying to international business and investment transactions."2 An
unfortunate concomitant of this increased congressional interest in
international tax policy has been the passage of legislation that is intended to
override inconsistent provisions in existing (and, in some cases, even future)
bilateral tax treaties. By enacting such legislation, Congress has been able to
bypass the renegotiation process and unilaterally conform tax treaties to the
now frequent changes in U.S. international tax policy.
The utility and expediency of this legislative tool notwithstanding, treaty
overrides constitute a breach of our obligations to our treaty partners as well
as of international law. Legislative overrides damage the reputation of the
United States as a member of the international community, undermine the
trust of our treaty partners, and harm U.S. citizens and residents by hindering
the Department of the Treasury in its efforts to obtain favorable concessions
from foreign governments when negotiating and renegotiating tax treaties.
For these reasons, members of the executive branch, our treaty partners, and
commentators have consistently decried the practice of enacting legislative
overrides, and have urged Congress to leave to the renegotiation process the
task of adapting tax treaties to legislative changes in U.S. international tax

*
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(1920).
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HARRY G. GOUREVITCH, TAx TREATIES: THE LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDE PROBLEM, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV. REP. No. 93-353 S (1993), available at LEXIS 93 TNI 172-15.
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policy. Unfortunately, Congress has ignored these pleas and has continued to
enact legislative overrides with impunity.
Since there is no effective remedy (either legal or diplomatic) under
international law for breach of a tax treaty obligation, it falls to adversely
affected taxpayers to force Congress to abide by these obligations as a matter
of domestic law. To aid these taxpayers and advance this cause, I call on
commentators to cease pleading with Congress to eschew the harmful practice
of enacting legislative overrides, and urge them instead to redirect their efforts
toward developing theories that circumscribe Congress' power to override tax
treaties. By widely disseminating such theories among the practicing tax bar,
challenges to what has become an accepted (albeit repugnant) congressional
practice are more likely to be entertained (and, hopefully, upheld) by the
courts.
Having issued this call, I feel obliged to be the first to respond. I have
included below an argument, based on the Supreme Court's decision in
Clinton v. City of New York,3 that Congress lacks the power to enact
legislation that overrides inconsistent provisions in tax treaties. I invite
members of the practicing tax bar to explore, verify, and (assuming they have
satisfied themselves as to its soundness) adopt this argument in challenging
tax deficiencies that are based on Internal Revenue Code provisions that
purport to override the otherwise applicable provisions of a tax treaty.
THE TREATY OVERRIDE PROBLEM

The History and Purpose of Tax Treaties
Following World War I, the movement to eliminate double taxation
"gathered considerable momentum, due to the high postwar tax rates and to
the growing realization that double taxation... is unscientific and unsound."
Double taxation' was perceived, even then, as a "barrier to the expansion of

3.

524 U.S. 417 (1998).

4. International Double Taxation: Hearing on H.k 10,165 Before the House Comm. on Ways
andMeans,71st Cong. 4(1930) (statement ofA.W. Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury), reprinted in STAFF
OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 87TH CONG., I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF UNITED
STATES TAX CONVENTIONS 18 (Comm. Print 1962) (hereinafier Hearing on International Double
Taxation].

5. Double taxation occurs when the same income is subject to tax in two different countries. For
example, one country may assert taxing jurisdiction over certain income on the basis of the residence of
the taxpayer who received it while another country may assert taxing jurisdiction over the same income
on the basis of its source. See AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS
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foreign trade and investments," the "evils and burdens" of which were in need
of mitigation.' During the 1920s, the League of Nations and the International
Chamber of Commerce began to study the problem ofdouble taxation, and the
League of Nations undertook the further task of drafting model conventions
for the prevention of double taxation.7 During this same time period,
European countries began to conclude bilateral treaties with each other in an
effort to reduce the burdens of double taxation.8 After exploring alternative
means of mitigating the burdens of double taxation, the United States joined
this effort and concluded its first bilateral tax treaty in 1932. 9
In the nearly seventy years since the conclusion of this treaty, the United
States' network of bilateral tax treaties has expanded dramatically. The U.S.

network of income tax treaties has grown to embrace more than sixty
countries, while the U.S. network of estate and gift tax treaties now embraces
sixteen countries.' 0 The terms of these treaties have not remained static, but
have been the subject of continuous refinement through the negotiation of
protocols and, where appropriate, superseding treaties. The U.S. network of
tax treaties has the potential for even further growth; in fact, the Department

OFUNITEDSTATES INCOMETAXATION If: PROPOSALSON UNITEDSTATES INCOMETAXTREATIES 5 (1992).
6. Hearing on InternationalDouble Taxation, supra note 4, at 4, reprintedin STAFF OF JOINT
COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 87TH CONG., 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF UNITED STATES TAX

CONVENTIONS 18 (Comm. Print 1962). The alternative considered was the enactment of a tax regime
under which non-U.S. persons would be exempt from tax on all income except
income from (1) a business, trade, or profession carried on in the United States through a
permanent establishment; (2) compensation forpersonal services rendered in the United States; and
(3) income derived from real property located in the United States, rentals and royalties therefrom,
gains from the sale or other disposition thereof, and interest on obligations (other than those of a
corporation), secured by such property.
Id.at 3-4, reprinted in STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 87TH CONG., I
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF UNITED STATES TAX CONVENTIONS 17-18 (Comm. Print 1962). Application
of this regime was conditioned on the enactment of a reciprocal regime by the non-U.S. person's country
of residence. See infra note 62 for a discussion of a similar, more recent proposal.
7.
Ke Chin Wang, InternationalDouble Taxation of Incorme: Relief Through International
Agreement 1921-1945, 59 HARV. L. REV. 73, 81-102 (1945).
8.
Id at 102-07; Hearingon InternationalDoubleTaxation,supranote 4,at 4, reprintedin STAFF
OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 87TH CONG., I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF UNITED
STATES TAX CONVENTIONS 18 (Comm. Print 1962).
9.
Convention Concerning Double Taxation, Apr. 27, 1932, U.S.-Fr., 49 Stat. 3145.
10. Andre Fogarasi et al., CurrentStatus of U.S. Tax Treaties,30 TAXMGM'TINT'L J. 252 (2001)
(listing the countries). An income tax treaty with Slovenia has already been approved by the Senate, and
merely awaits the exchange of instruments of ratification before it enters into force. Id. The Department
of the Treasury recently announced that the United States has also reached agreement with Bangladesh
on the text of an income tax treaty. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury (May 3, 2001), available at
LEXS 2001 WTD 88-27.
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of the Treasury is currently negotiating tax treaties with an additional eleven
countries."
The U.S. network of income tax treaties has grown at such a remarkable
pace because income tax treaties are
an important element inthe overall international economic policy of the United States.
One of the fundamental objectives of this policy is to minimize impediments to the free
international flow of capital and technology. This objective is fostered by the broadest
possible network of income tax treaties. Among the major impediments to free capital
and technology flows are the rules of national tax systems and their interaction with the
systems of other countries. Tax treaties seek to eliminate, or at least mitigate, the impact
of these impediments."2

Estate and gift tax treaties serve a similar purpose:
[T]reaties for the avoidance of double taxation.., are an important means by which
governments create a favorable atmosphere for foreign trade and investment. Estate tax
treaties along with income tax treaties help to bring about adjustments in two tax systems
in such a way that movements of trade and investment between two countries may be
facilitated and that conflicts in tax policy are substantially reduced or eliminated ....
The elimination of double taxation in connection with the settlement in one country of
estates in which nationals of another country have interests contributes also toward
greater international understanding by removing a deterrent to the movement of
individuals between countries. 3

11. Fogarasi et al., supra note 10. 1 have included in this category Sri Lanka, with which the
United States concluded an income tax treaty in 1985. This treaty was not ratified due to the existence of
open issues relating to bank secrecy. The Department of the Treasury has also been considering whether
negotiations with Sri Lanka need to be re-opened to take into account the impact of the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 on the terms of the treaty. Id.
12. Tax Treaties: Hearing on Various Tax TreatiesBefore the S.Comm. on Foreign Relations,
97th Cong. 7-8 (1982) (statement of John E. Chapoton, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Tax Policy).
The importance ofthe global tax treaty network has been underscored by the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development, which has stated that
[d]ouble taxation agreements (tax treaties) are an essential element in facilitating economic
relations between States and encouraging flows of capital and labor. They form a firm and reliable
basis for tax relations between States. They limit and regulate the taxing jurisdiction of the States
entering into them so as to ensure the orderly application ofthe domestic tax laws of what are often
quite different systems. Their importance is underlined by the large numbers that are currently in
force and the fact that international organizations and the business community repeatedly
recommend the enlargement and improvement of the treaty network.
COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION &DEv., TAX TREATY OVERRIDES I (1990)
(footnote omitted), availableat LEXIS 90 TNI 7-13 [hereinafter OECD REPORT].
13. S.ExEc. REP. No. 87-11, app. at 25 (1961) (statement of Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary
of State for Economic Affairs), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF UNITED STATES TAX
CONVENTIONS at Canada 93B (Sidney I. Roberts ed., 1993).
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Tax treaties have also come to serve another purpose, namely the prevention
of tax evasion. This purpose is accomplished through information exchange
provisions that are now routinely included in U.S. tax treaties.14
The Recent Rise in Legislative Overrides
In 1962, Congress for the first time expressed an intent to override 15 tax
treaties through the passage of legislation. 6 Since that time, Congress has
with increasing frequency' enacted legislation that is intended to override
inconsistent provisions in existing (and, in some cases, even future 8 ) tax

14. GOUREViTCH, supra note 2, available at LEXIS 93 TNI 172-15; U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX
CONVENTION art. 26 (1996), reprinted in I Tax Treaties 1022-A, at 1426-0 to 1426-P (Warren, Gorham

& Lamont 1996); U.S. MODEL ESTATE, GIFT, AND GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX CONVENTION
art. 12 (1980), reprinted in 1 Tax Treaties 1020, at 1396-97 (Warren, Gorham & Lamnont 1996). The
United States has also entered into exchange of information agreements with a number of countries that
are not otherwise part of our tax treaty network. See Fogarasi et al., supra note 10.
15. When I speak of "legislative overrides," I mean legislation that is intended by Congress "to
have effects in clear contradiction to international treaty obligations." OECD REPORT, supranote 12, 5,
available at LEXIS 90 TNI 7-13. Thus, for example, I am not including within the ambit of this term
legislation enacted by Congress that changes the definition of a term not otherwise defined in a treaty,
because U.S. tax treaties normally provide that any term not defined in the treaty will have the meaning
ascribed to it by the laws of the country whose tax is being applied (thereby vesting in Congress the power
to define, as well as the prerogative to change the definition of, such a term). Id. 4(b), available at
LEXIS 90 TNI 7-13; U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION art. 3, para. 2 (1996), reprinted in I Tax
Treaties
1022-A, at 1426-C (Warren, Gorham & Lamont 1996); U.S. MODEL ESTATE, GIFT, AND
GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX CONVENTION art. 3, para. 2 (1980), reprinted in I Tax Treaties
11020, at 1392 (Warren, Gorham & Lamont 1996). But see Anthony C. Infanti, The Proposed Domestic
Reverse Hybrid Entity Regulations: Can the Treasury Department Override Treaties?, 30 TAX MGM'T
INT'L J. 307, 310 (2001).
16. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 31, 76 Stat. 961, 1069 (1962) (generally providing
that the Act would override all existing tax treaties). In fact, the Department of the Treasury determined
that there were "no conflicts between provisions of the bill and provisions of tax treaties, with one minor
exception relating to the... Greek Estate Tax Treaty," which the Department of the Treasury indicated
it would attempt to renegotiate before July 1, 1964. H.R. CONF. REP.NO. 87-2508, at 48 (1962), reprinted
in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3732, 3770.
17. See GOUREVITCH, supra note 2, available at LEXIS 93 TNI 172-15 ("Since about 1980
Congress has enacted tax legislation almost yearly. With increasing frequency such legislation has
overridden provisions in U.S. bilateral income tax treaties with other countries."); OECD REPORT, supra
note 12, 2, available at LEXIS 90 TNI 7-13 ("The certainty that tax treaties bring to international tax
matters has, in the past few years, been called into question, and to some extent undermined, by the
tendency in certain States for domestic legislation to be passed or proposed which may override provisions
of tax treaties."); Treaty Overrides: OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs Report on Tax Treaty Overrides,
2 TAX NOTES INT'L 25, 25 (1990) (indicating that, even though the OECD Report "never mentions the
United States, the [report] was almost certainly written in response to the recent treaty override actions,
and threatened actions, of the U.S. Congress").
18. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 269B(d) (2001).
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treaties. Indeed, nearly every major piece of tax legislation since the mid1970s has contained one or more provisions that were intended to override (or
that have had the effect of overriding) tax treaties:
" Tax Reduction Act of 1975-section 601 (foreign tax credits)"9 ;
" Tax Reform Act of 1976-section 1031 (foreign tax credits)°;
" Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act of 1980-section I125(c) (concerning
the tax consequences to non-U.S. persons of disposing of a direct or indirect interest
in U.S. real property) 21;
" Deficit Reduction Act of 1984--section 136 ("stapled" stock)';
* Tax Reform Act of 1986-section 1241 (the branch profits tax)'3 and section
1810(a)(4) (foreign tax credits) 24;
" Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988-section 101 2(aa)(2) (providing
that specified provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 would retroactively override

tax treaties)P;

" Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989--section 7210 (the"earnings stripping" rules),

26

section 7403 (concerning information reporting with respect to foreign-owned
domestic corporations)," and section 781 5(d)(14) (concerning the estate tax marital
deduction for non-citizen spouses)2";
* Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993-section 13,238 (authorizing the
promulgation ofregulations recharacterizing multiple-party financing transactions) 9 ;

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Pub. L.No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 26, 54 (1975). See Rev. Rul. 80-223, 1980-2 C.B. 217.
Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, 1620(1976). See Rev. Rul. 80-201, 1980-2 C.B. 221.
Pub. L. No. 96-499, 94 Stat. 2599, 2690-91 (1980).
Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, 669 (1984).
Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2576 (1986). See Richard L. Doemberg, Legislative

Override of Income Tax Treaties: The Branch Profits Tax and CongressionalArrogationof Authority,

42 TAx LAw. 173 (1989) (indicating that the branch profits tax violates the nondiscrimination provisions
in many income tax treaties by limiting their application in situations where the United States believes that
"treaty shopping" may be occurring).
24. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2822-23 (1986).
25. Pub. L.No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342, 3531 (1988).
26. Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106,2339 (1989). See Richard L. Doemberg, OverridingTax
Treaties: The US. Perspective, 9 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 71, 92-105 (1995) (arguing that the earnings

stripping rules violate nondiscrimination provisions in many income tax treaties).
27. Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106,2359-61 (1989). See H.R. REP.No. 101-247, at 1301-02
(1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2771-72 (arguing that the information reporting
requirements do not violate the nondiscrimination provisions found in many income tax treaties, but
stating that, ifthe reporting requirements are found to violate the nondiscrimination provisions of atreaty,
the reporting requirements will override inconsistent treaty provisions). But see Sanford H. Goldberg &
Peter A. Glicklich, Treaty-BasedNondiscrimination: Now You See ItNow You Don't, 1 FLA. TAX REv.

51, 78 (1992) (indicating that the reporting provisions may, in fact, violate the nondiscrimination
provisions in many income tax treaties).
28. Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106, 2418 (1989). See H.R. CoNF.REP. No. 101-386, at
668-70 (1989), reprintedin 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 3271-73.
29. Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312, 508 (1993). See Timothy S. Guenther, Tax Treaties and
Overrides: The Multiple-Party FinancingDilemma, 16 VA. TA REv. 645, 668-70 (1997) (arguing that
regulations relating to the characterization of multiple-party financing arrangements, promulgated under
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" Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996-section 511 (taxation
of expatriates)3"; and
* Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997-section 1054(a) (concerning the application ofincome
tax treaties to "hybrid" entities)."'

The Devolving CongressionalAttitude Toward Tax Treaties

The alarming nature of this pattern of legislative overrides was confirmed
in 1988, when Congress amended the provision governing the interaction
between tax treaties and the Internal Revenue Code. Prior to 1988, § 894(a)

of the Internal Revenue Code provided that "[i]ncome of any kind, to the
extent required by any treaty obligation of the United States, shall not be
included in gross income and shall be exempt from taxation under this
subtitle."32 In 1988, this provision, which appeared to give priority to treaties

(but which Congress had characterized as a mere "cross reference to
treaties"33 ), was replaced by § 894(a)(1),34 which now provides that "[t]he
provisions of this title shall be applied to any taxpayer with due regardtoany
treaty obligation of the United States which applies to such taxpayer.""

At first blush, the switch from the more emphatic language of pre-1988
§ 894(a) to the "due regard" standard may not appear to have effected a
radical change in the relationship between tax treaties and the Internal
Revenue Code; however, the true import of this change cannot be fully

the authority of this section, override treaty obligations); Linda E. Carlisle & Geoffrey B. Lanning, Tax
Treatment of Substitute Payments Under Securities Lending and Sale Repurchase Transactions, 15 J.
TAX'N INv. 246 (1998) (arguing that regulations relating to the source and character of substitute dividend
and interest payments, promulgated under the authority of this section, override treaty obligations).
30. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936,2093 (1996). See H.R. CoNF.REP.No. 104-736, at 329,
338 (1996), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1990,2142,2151 (evincing an explicit intent to override tax
treaties); Notice 97.19, 1997-1 C.B. 394, 402 (same).
31. Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788, 943 (1997). See Robert Critchfield et al., Pass-Through
Entities,Double Tax Conventions, and Treaty Overrides, 82 TAXNOTES 873, 887-89 (1999) (arguing that
the portion of this section codified at I.R.C. § 894(c)(1) overrides at least one income tax treaty); Peter H.
Blessing, Final§ 894(c)(2) Regulations, 29 TAX MGM'T INT'L J.499 (2000) (indicating that the portion
of this section codified at I.R.C. § 894(c)(2) was intended to override income tax treaties).
32. I.R.C. § 894(a) (1985) (emphasis added).
33. H.R. Cowt. REP. No. 100-1104, at 12 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5048, 5072.
34. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 1012(aa)(6), 102
Stat. 3342, 3533 (1988).
35. I.R.C. § 894(a)(1) (2001) (emphasis added). It appears that, prior to 1988, the only provision
in the Internal Revenue Code governing the interaction between treaties and the estate and gift taxes was
§ 7852(d), which provided that no provision of the code would "apply where its application would be
contrary to any treaty obligation of the United States in effect on" August 16, 1954. I.R.C. § 7852(d)
(1985). RIcHARD B. STEPHENS ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXATION 7.02[5] (5th ed. 1983).
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understood without reading §894(aX) in conjunction with §7852(d),3 6 which
was also replaced in 1988. New § 7852(d) fleshes out the "due regard"
standard in § 894(a)(1) by providing that "[f]or purposes of determining the
relationship between a provision of a treaty and any law of the United States
affecting revenue, neither the treaty nor the law shall have preferential status

by reason of its being a treaty or law."37 The addition of § 7852(d) to the
Internal Revenue Code was an attempt by Congress to codify its own peculiar

interpretation of the judicially-created "later-in-time" rule. upon which its
legislative overrides have been based.
Under the later-in-time rule, in the event of a conflict between a treaty
and a statute, "the one last in date will control the other."3 This rule is
premised on the dubious notion that treaties and statutes are on equal footing
under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,39 because "no superior
efficacy is given to either over the other."40 The later-in-time rule was first
articulated in 1855 in a trial court opinion written by Supreme Court Justice
Curtis (acting in his capacity as circuit justice),4 and was subsequently

36. I.R.C. § 7852(d) (2001). Current § 894(a)(2) contains a cross-reference to § 7852(d). I.R.C.
§ 894(a)(2) (2001).
37. I.R.C. § 7852(d) (2001).
38. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
39. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2 (providing that the "Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land"). Income tax conventions are
"treaties" in the constitutional sense. Samann v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 461,463 (4th Cir. 1963); Am.
Trust Co. v. Smyth, 247 F.2d 149,153 (9th Cir. 1957), overruledon othergrounds by Maximov v. United
States, 373 U.S. 49 (1963).
40. Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194. See RESTATEMENT(THiRD) OFFOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115 cmt.
a (1987). For a discussion of the evolution of the rationale for the later-in-time rule, see David Sachs, Is
the 19th Century Doctrine of Treaty Override Good Lawfor Modern Day Tax Treaties?, 47 TAX LAW.
867, 867-70 (1994), and Jules Lobel, The Limits of ConstitutionalPower: Conflicts Between Foreign
Policy and InternationalLaw, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1104-1110 (1985).
Commentators have questioned the logical underpinning ofthe later-in-time rule, which, if carried
to its natural conclusion, would also put statutes and the Constitution on equal footing under the
Supremacy Clause because "no superior efficacy is given to either over the other." Whitney, 124 U.S. at
194. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text; Sachs, supra;Doemberg, supranote 26, at 79-80;
Louis Henkin, Treaties in a ConstitutionalDemocracy, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 406,425-26 (1989); COMMs.
ON U.S. ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN TAXPAYERS AND FOREIGN ACTIVITIES OF U.S. TAXPAYERS, N.Y. STATE
BAR Ass'N, LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDES OF TAX TREATIES (1987), reprinted in New York State Bar
Association Tax Section Opposes Treaty Override Provisionsin the Technical CorrectionsBill, 37 TAX
NOTES 931, 932 n.5 (1987) [hereinafter NYSBA REPORT]; Lobel, supra, at 1104.
41. Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855) (No. 13,799), affid, 67 U.S. (2 Black)
481 (1862). See The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 621 (1870). •
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adopted by the Supreme Court in a series of cases. 2 By the close of the 19th
'43
century, the later-in-time rule had come to be viewed as "black-letter law.
Since that time, the Supreme Court has limited and clarified the later-intime rule by providing that "[a] treaty will not be deemed to have been
abrogated or modified by a later statute unless such purpose on the part of
Congress has been clearly expressed."" This "firm and obviously sound
canon of construction against finding implicit repeal of a treaty in ambiguous
congressional action" has been reiterated in a number of cases; however,
when Congress codified the later-in-time rule in § 7852(d), it specifically
rejected this canon of construction. Congress instead opted for its own
peculiar interpretation of the later-in-time rule under which any conflict
between a later statute and an earlier treaty would be resolved in favor of the
statute--without regard to whether Congress had expressed an intent to
override the treaty or had even considered the impact of the statute on the
treaty:
The committee does not believe that Congress can either actually or theoretically know
in advance all of the implications for each treaty, or the treaty system, of changes in
domestic law, and therefore Congress cannot at the time it passes each tax bill address
all potential treaty conflict issues raised by that bill. This complexity, and the resulting
necessary gaps in Congressional foreknowledge about treaty conflicts, make it difficult
for the committee to be assured that its tax legislative policies are given effect unless it
is confident that where they conflict with existing treaties, they will nevertheless
prevail."

The codification of this sweeping interpretation of the later-in-time rule
provides concrete evidence of Congress' devolving attitude toward our tax
treaty network. Some commentators have speculated that this congressional
antipathy toward tax treaties may have its roots in the tension that inheres in
our constitutional system of separated powers and checks and balances.47 The

42. -See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581,585.86 (1889); Whitney, 124 U.S. at 193-94;
The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884).
43. Sachs, supra note 40, at 870.
44. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933).
45. Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243,252, reh 'g denied, 467 U.S. 1231
(1984). See also McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22 (1963);
Blanco v.United States, 775 F.2d 53,61 (2d Cir. 1985); Torres v.Immigration& Naturalization Serv., 602
F.2d 190, 195 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v.White, 508 F.2d 453,456 (8th Cir. 1974); Ungo v. Beachie,
311 F.2d 905, 907 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 911 (1963).
46. S.REP. No. 100-445, at 326 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4515, 4837.
47. Doemberg, supra note 26, at 78-79; H. David Rosenbloom, Toward aNew Tax Treaty Policy
for a New Decade, 9 AM. J.TAX POL'Y 77, 79 (1991). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 332 (James
Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (acknowledging that "power is of an encroaching nature, and that

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:677

Constitution vests the power to negotiate and ratify treaties in the President,
subject to the advice and consent of the Senate: "[The President] shall have
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties,
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur. . . ."" Although the
framers may have envisioned an active advisory role for the Senate during the
treaty-making process, the Senate has not often played such a role49 ; in
practice, the President "appoints and instructs the negotiators and follows their
progress in negotiation," while the Senate "deliberate[s] and pass[es]

judgment" after the fact."

The Senate's limited role in the treaty-making

process (and the notable absence of any role for the House of
Representatives") has probably engendered resentment on the part of
Congress, because the Treaty Clause vests in the President a quasi-legislative
power 2 that permits him to create supreme law of the land" without running

the gauntlet of Article I of the Constitution. The fires of this resentment can
only have been stoked by Congress' perception that it is "extremely
it ought to be effectually restrained from passing the limits assigned to it").
48. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 [hereinafter Treaty Clause].
49. See Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 131 (1972); 3 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1517, at 370 (1833).
50. HENIN, supranote 49, at 130-3 1. See also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304, 319 (1936) ("[Tlhe President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the
nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the field
of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.").
51. The House of Representatives does, however, play a role in implementing a treaty when the
treaty is "non-self-executing." HENKIN, supra note 49, at 156-62. Chief Justice Marshall described the
difference between a self-executing and a non-self-executing treaty as follows:
A treaty is, in its nature, a contract between two nations, not a legislative act. It does not
generally effect, of itself, the object to be accomplished, especially, so far as its operation is infraterritorial; but is carried into execution by the sovereign power of the respective parties to the
instrument. In the United States, a different principle is established. Our constitution declares a
treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts ofjustice as equivalent
to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative
provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract-when either of the parties
engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial
department; and the legislature must execute the contract, before it can become a rule for the Court.
Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 313-14 (1829). By their terms, tax treaties are generally selfexecuting; in other words, they are intended to operate "without the aid of any legislative provision." Id.
at 314. See Lidas, Inc. v. United States, 83 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 99-1112, 99-1115 (C.D. Cal. 1999), affid,
238 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2245 (2001); Am. LAw INST., supra note 5, at 22; S.
ExEc. REP. No. 103-20, at 89 n.74 (1993). Thus, the House of Representatives normally plays no role in
either the making or implementation of tax treaties.
52. THE FEDERALISTNO. 75, at 504 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (the treaty
power "partake[s] more of the legislative than of the executive character, though it does not seem strictly
to fall within the definition of either of them").
53. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

2001]

TAX TREATY OVERRIDES

difficult" 4 to renegotiate tax treaties to ensure that their provisions reflect
legislative changes in U.S. international tax policy.
Congress' failure to respect our treaty obligations harms the United States
in a number of ways. First, each time it enacts a legislative override,
Congress causes the United States to violate international law," damaging the
United States' reputation as a member of the international community as well
as the international legal order itself.56 Second, because treaties are really no

54. S.REP. NO. 100-445, at 323 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4515, 4835.
55. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 26, 8 1.L.M. 679, 690
("Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.")
art. 39, 8 1.L.M. at 694 ("A treaty may be amended by agreement
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]; id.
between the parties."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115(1)(b) (1986) ("That a
rule of international law or a provision of an international agreement is superseded as domestic law does
not relieve the United States of its international obligation or of the consequences of a violation of that
obligation."); AM. LAW INST., supra note 5, at 73 ("That a statute may be effective to supersede a prior
treaty as a matter of U.S. internal law does not relieve the United States of its obligations under the treaty.
By failing to honor its international obligation, the United States violates the established international law
principlepactasuntservanda."(footnotes omitted)); I OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW: PEACE § 624,
at 1254 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) ("A treaty may be amended by afurther treaty
between the parties[,] ...by an oral agreement, or by a tacit agreement evidenced by the subsequent
practice of the parties.").
The United States has signed, but not ratified, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
Nevertheless, those provisions of the convention that constitute the codification ofcustomary international
law (as opposed to the progressive development of international law) are binding on the United States.
See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). Articles 26 and 39 of the Vienna Convention, cited
above, do no more than codify customary international law. Article 26 "reproduces, in lapidary language,
the basic principle pacta sunt servanda, designated by the [International Law] Commission as 'the
fundamental principle of the law of treaties."' IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES 83 (2d ed. 1984) (quoting Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of Its
Article 39 codifies
Eighteenth Session, [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 211, U.N. Doc. A16309/Rev. 1).
the general rule of customary international law "that a treaty may not be revised without the consent of
all the parties." Id.at 106; EDWIN C. HOYT,THE UNANIMITY RULE INTHE REVISION OF TREATIES 1
(1959). Thus, articles 26 and 39 of the Vienna Convention are binding on the United States.
One should not, however, be deceived into believing that mutual agreement of the parties is the only
means of extrication from a treaty. A party to a treaty may terminate the treaty (or suspend its operation)
in whole or in part if the other party materially breaches the treaty. Vienna Convention, supra,art. 60, 8
I.L.M. at 701. In addition, impossibility of performance or a fundamental change of circumstances
(clausularebus sic stantibus) may justify the termination (or the suspension of the operation) of a treaty.
Id. arts. 61-62, 8 I.L.M. at 702.
56. Professor Verzijl made the following remarks concerning the importance of the basic principle
pacta sunt servanda [agreements must be kept], which is codified in article 26 of the Vienna Convention:
Without its operation and general acceptance as an axiom of inter-state intercourse no true and
effective international law is indeed conceivable: when and where, and to the extent to which, that
foundation-stone of the international system crumbles, the entire legal order is doomed to collapse,
as experience has only too often demonstrated. This self-evident truth is the incontrovertible
corollary of the fact that, whereas a municipal legal order is erected on the command "You shall",
the international legal system rests on the undertaking "We shall". Whenever those "We" break
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more than contracts between sovereign nations, legislative overrides erode the
trust of our treaty partners by undermining their expectation that the United
States will remain faithful to its treaty obligations. 7 Finally, legislative
overrides harm U.S. citizens and residents who may wish to avail themselves
of the benefits of tax treaties, because (i) concern with the congressional
proclivity for enacting legislative overrides has led an increasing number of
our treaty partners to insist upon a right to renegotiate or retaliate in the event
of a legislative override,58 and (ii) the Department of the Treasury has
indicated that "it is also becoming increasingly difficult to negotiate reciprocal
concessions when the foreign government fears that the United States may
unilaterally reverse the bargain by legislative action."59

faith, their legal order also necessarily breaks down.

I J.H. W. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW INHISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 244 (1968). See also PHILLIP C.
JESSUP, A MODERN LAWOFNATIONS 2, 154 (1948) (arguing for a"basic recognition ofthe interest which
the whole international society has in the observance of its law"); J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAWOFNATIONs 331
(Humphrey Wadock ed., 6th ed. 1963) ("It is a truism to say that no international interest is more vital
than the observance of good faith between states, and the 'sanctity' of treaties is a necessary corollary.").
57. John Turro, OECD Ambassadors Protest Rostenkowski Foreign Tax Bill, 5 TAX NOTES INT'L
289 (1992); Letter from Emmanuel de Margerie, Ambassador of France to the United States, to James A.
Baker III, Secretary of the Treasury (July 16, 1987), reprintedin EEC Group of Six Addresses 1986 Act's
Treaty Override Provisions,36 TAXNOTES 437 (1987) ("The violation of a double tax treaty by unilateral
action of one contracting party undermines the basis of trust existing between the two countries
involved. ...").
58. See, e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income
and the Prevention of Fraud or Fiscal Evasion, Aug. 25, 1999, U.S.-Italy, Protocol, art. 7, para. 1, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 106-11, at 53 (1999) (as of this writing, this treaty has not entered into force);
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, Oct. 2, 1996, U.S.Switz., art. 28, par. 5, S.TREATY Doc. No. 105-8, at 91-92 (1997); Convention for the Avoidance of

Double Taxation and the Prevention ofFiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital,
Mar. 28, 1984, U.S.-Can., Protocol, art. 17, para. 7, S.TREATY Doc. No. 104-4, at 19 (1995); Convention
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on
Income, Jan. 26, 1993, U.S.-Isr., Protocol, art. V, para. 4, S.TREATY DOC. No. 103-16, at 8-9 (1993);
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to
Taxes on Income, Sept. 18, 1992, U.S.-Mex., Protocol, par. 20, S. TREATY Doc. NO. 103-7, at 70 (1993);
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to
Taxes on Income, Dec. 18, 1992, U.S.-Neth., Exchange of Notes, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-6, at xxi-xxiv
(1993).
59. PendingBilateralTax Treaties and OECD Tax Convention: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on
ForeignRelations, 101st Cong. 13 (1990) (statement of Kenneth W. Gideon, Assistant Secretary for Tax
Policy, U.S. Department of the Treasury); Richard E. Andersen, Senate Hearings Focus on Policies
Toward Developing Nations and Treaty Overrides, I J. INT'L TAX'N 189, 191 (1990) ("Successive
presidential administrations have vigorously opposed this legislative trend, on the theory that unilateral
treaty overrides impede the negotiation of binding treaties with trading partners and run the risk of
retaliatory action against U.S. investors.").
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THE CALL TO ACTION

For these reasons, members of the executive branch,' our treaty
partners, 6' and commentators 62 have decried the use of legislative overrides

60. See, e.g., Tax Treatment of ExpatriatedCitizens: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on Fin., 104th
Cong. 5-6 (1995) (statement of Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, U.S. Department
of the Treasury); Ta Conventions with: The Russian Federation,Treaty Doc. 102-39; United Mexican
States, Treaty Doc. 103-7; The Czech Republic, Treaty Doc. 103-17; The Slovak Republic, Treaty Doc.
103-18; and The Netherlands, Treaty Doc. 103-6. ProtocolsAmending Tax Conventions with: Israel,
Treaty Doc. 103-16; The Netherlands, Treaty Doc. 103-19; andBarbados,TreatyDoc. 102-41: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on ForeignRelations, 103d Cong. 9-10, 20 (1993) (statement of Leslie B. Samuels,
Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, U.S. Department of the Treasury); Pending BilateralTax Treatiesand
OECD Tax Convention: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 101st Cong. 13 (1990)
(statement of Kenneth W. Gideon, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, U.S. Department of the Treasury);
Andersen, supra note 59, at 191; InternationalTaxes: CongressShows Willingness to Override Treaty
Provisions,Treasury OfficialSays, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) at G-1 (Jan. 29, 1990); Interview by Eric R. Fox
with Philip D. Morrison, International Tax Counsel, U.S. Department of the Treasury (Feb. 27, 1990),
reprintedin One Treaty at a Time, Says International Tax Counsel, I J. INT'L TAX'N 40 (1990); Tax
Treaties: TreasuryOfficial Warns of Effects of Treaty Overrides, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) at G-3 (Nov. 1,
1990); The Technical Corrections Act of 1987: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt
Mgmt. ofthe S. Comm. on Fin., 100th Cong. 16-21 (1988) (statement of O. Donaldson Chapoton, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, U.S. Department of the Treasury); Interview with Stephen E. Shay,
International Tax Counsel, U.S. Department of the Treasury (Aug. 20, 1987), availableat LEXIS 87 TNI
34-3; Letter from James A. Baker 111,Secretary of the Treasury, to Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman, U.S.
House Committee on Ways and Means (July 31,1986), reprintedin Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) at G-8 (Aug. 1,
1986); Letter from James A. Baker 1ll, Secretary of the Treasury, to Robert Packwood, Chairman, U.S.
Senate Committee on Finance (Apr. 7, 1986), reprintedin Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) at J-1 (Apr. 16, 1986).
But see Infanti, supranote 15, at 307.
61. See, e.g., Hans Gattermann, U.S. Tax Treaty OverridesAreUnacceptable,12 TAxNOTEsINT'L
1238 (1990); ForeignInvestment: Embassy OfficialsCriticize UnilateralU.S. Tax TreatyOverrides,Daily
Tax Rep. (BNA) at G-4 (June 22, 1990); OECD REPORT, supranote 12, IN34-39, availableat LEXIS 90
TNI 7-13; Letter from Ambassador of Federal Republic of Germany to Claiborne Pell, Chairman, U.S.
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Apr. 18, 1988), availableat LEXIS 88 TNI 17-20; Letter from
Emmanuel de Margerie to James A. Baker Ill, supra note 57, reprintedin EEC Group of Six Addresses
1986 Act's Treaty Override Provisions,36 TAx NOTES 437 (1987); Tax Treaties: Dutch Minister Warns
Against Unilateralityin Trade Bill, Moves to Override Treaties, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) at G-7 (Nov. 6,
1987).
62. See, e.g., Philip F. Postlewaite & David S. Makarski, The AL.L Tax Treaty Study-A Critique
and a Modest Proposal,52 TAx LAW. 731, 740, 749-50 (1999); Critchfield et al., supra note 31, at 889;
Guenther, supranote 29, at 680; AM. LAw INST., supra note 5, at 78; Rosenbloom, supranote 47, at 82;
Doernberg, supra note 23, at 210; NYSBA REPORT, supra note 40, reprintedIn New York State Bar
Association Tax Section Opposes Treaty Override Provisionsin the Technical CorrectionsBill, 37 TAX
NOTES 931, 937 (1987).
In at least one instance, commentators have proposed eliminating income tax treaties as a means of
solving the legislative override problem. See Postlewaite & Makarski, supra, at 800-40. These
commentators have instead advocated the codification of the 1996 U.S. Model Income Tax Convention
in place of the current international tax regime in the Internal Revenue Code. Id. While the codification
of certain treaty provisions may be advisable as a policy matter, the soundness of a wholesale elimination
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to conform tax treaties to the now frequent changes in U.S. international tax
policy, and they have called on Congress to respect U.S. treaty obligations by
limiting modifications of tax treaties to the renegotiation process. Congress
has not heeded these calls to observe the norms of international law, but rather
has continued to override tax treaties with impunity. 63 Congress' continued
enactment of legislative overrides despite these numerous, strident
protestations is ample evidence of their futility.
The time has come to stop expressing outrage at the enactment of
legislative overrides and to start taking action. Congress can no longer be
permitted to undermine the integrity of our tax treaty network, to the
detriment not only of our treaty partners but also ofU.S. citizens and residents
with investments and/or activities abroad. Since there is no effective remedy
(either legal or diplomatic) under international law for a breach of a tax treaty
obligation,' it falls to the taxpayers adversely affected by breaches of these
obligations to force Congress to abide by their terms as a matter of domestic

law.
Fortunately, given the interest expressed by commentators in curtailing
legislative overrides,65 the task need not fall to these taxpayers alone. I call
on commentators to stop urging Congress to refrain from enacting legislative
overrides and, instead, to devote their energies to (i) developing theories for
circumscribing Congress' power to enact legislative overrides and (ii)
disseminating those theories among the practicing tax bar. By more widely
calling into question Congress' ability to enact legislative overrides,
commentators may be able to chip away at the patina of legitimacy that the

of the U.S. tax treaty network in favor of this codified regime is subject to question. See Rosenbloom,
supra note 47, at 80. Among other things, this codified regime would eliminate (i) the discretion that the
United States currently exercises in targeting the application of treaty provisions (and the most beneficial
treaty rates of tax) to the residents of certain countries and (ii) the benefits that U.S. citizens and residents
receive from concessions obtained by the U.S. Department ofthe Treasury during treaty negotiations. It
is also worth noting that a codified regime was considered, and rejected, by the United States as an
alternative to tax treaties in the early 1930s. See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
63. See supranotes 17-31 and accompanying text. At least one member of Congress has espoused
the view that legislative overrides no longer "constitute[] a violation of the treaty," because
the parties entering into these treaties know full well that the Congress has been prepared to
override these tax treaties, and therefore they go into them with that knowledge. Now, you can
make an argument that we should not do it, or you do not want us to do it, but I think to term it a
violation is an overstatement.
Pending Bilateral Tax Treaties and OECD Tax Convention: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 101st Cong. 61-62 (1990) (statement of Senator Sarbanes).
64. See Postlewaite & Makarski, supra note 62, at 748; Doemberg, supra note 26, at 115-121; AM.
LAW INST., supranote 5, at 73.
65. See supranote 62.
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passage of time has conferred on this questionable practice.' In addition, by
disseminating their theories among the practicing tax bar, commentators will
increase the likelihood that the courts will squarely and cogently address the
question whether Congress has the power to enact legislative overrides, and,
as a result, may finally achieve indirectly through the courts what they have
never been able to achieve through direct appeals to Congress.
The Response
Having issued this call, I will be the first to respond. The most obvious
means for constraining congressional authority to override tax treaties is a
challenge to the validity of the judicially-created later-in-time rule, which
serves as the basis for Congress' legislative overrides. Such a challenge could
take the form of(i) a direct challenge to the logical underpinning of the laterin-time rule, which has already been questioned by commentators,67 or (ii) a
collateral attack on the constitutionality of the later-in-time rule.
Unfortunately, the likelihood of a successful direct challenge is probably
relatively low, because the doctrine of stare decisis would prove a difficult
hurdle to overcome. The Supreme Court has indicated that, even in
constitutional cases, the doctrine of stare decisis requires some "special
justification" as a basis for departure from precedent. 8 Simple disagreement
with the reasoning behind the later-in-time rule, which has been considered
"black-letter law" for more than a century, would probably not constitute such
a special justification."9
Given the difficulty inherent in mounting a direct challenge, I have
developed below a collateral attack on the constitutionality of the later-in-time
rule. This attack, which should provide the "special justification" necessary
to overcome the doctrine of stare decisis, is patterned after the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Clinton v. City of New York.7" The discussion of this

66. See supra note 40.
67. See supra note 40.
68. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,443 (2000) ("Whether or not we would agree with
Miranda's reasoning and its resulting rule, were we addressing the issue in the first instance, the principles
of stare decists weigh heavily against overruling it now. While "'stare decisis is not an inexorable
command,"' particularly when we are interpreting the Constitution, "even in constitutional cases, the
doctrine carries such persuasive force that we have always required a departure from precedent to be
supported by some 'special justification."'") (citations omitted).
69. Id.
70. 524 U.S. 417 (1998). During the course of my research, I came across two prc-Clinton
extradition treaty cases in which a similar argument was made; however, neither court reached the merits
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collateral attack is divided into two parts: first, the Court's decision in
Clinton is briefly summarized; then, the challenge to the constitutionality of
the later-in-time rule is developed using the rationale for the Court's decision
in Clinton as a guide.
Clinton v. City of New York
The Line Item Veto Act 7 empowered the President "to 'cancel in whole'
three types of provisions that have been signed into law: '(1) any dollar
amount of discretionary budget authority; (2) any item of new direct spending;
or (3) any limited tax benefit."' 72 At issue in Clinton was the constitutionality
of the President's cancellation pursuant to the Act of an "item of new direct
spending" in the Balanced Budget Act of 199773 (namely, foregoing the return
by the State of New York of as much as $2.6 billion in federal subsidies for
financing medical care for the indigent) and a "limited tax benefit" in the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 7 (namely, the extension of tax-free
reorganization status to acquisitions by certain food refiners and processors
of certain farmers' cooperatives).75
The President was required to follow a specific procedure in cancelling
these items. First, the President had to "consider the legislative history, the
purposes, and other relevant information about the items" when identifying
them for cancellation.7 6 The President was then required to "determine, with
respect to each cancellation, that it will '(i) reduce the Federal budget deficit;
(ii) not -impair any essential Government functions; and (iii) not harm the
national interest. "'I The President was finally required to "transmit a special
message to Congress notifying it of each cancellation within five calendar
days (excluding Sundays) after the enactment of the canceled provision. 7 8
Unless a "disapproval bill" was enacted into law, "the cancellation
prevent[ed] the item 'from having legal force or effect ' ' 79 as of the time

of the argument. See DeSena Gouveia v. Vokes, 800 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Hilario v. United
States, 854 F. Supp. 165 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
71. Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200(1996).
72. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 436 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 691(a) (Supp. 1994)).
73. Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4722(c), 11I Stat. 251, 515 (1997).
74. Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 968, 111 Stat. 788, 895-96 (1997).
75. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 436.

76. Id.
77. Id. (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 691(a)(3)(A)).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 437 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 691e(4)(B)-(C) (Supp. 1994)).
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Congress received the special message from the President concerning the
cancellation.
The Court invalidated the Line Item Veto Act on the narrow ground that
it permitted the President, both legally and practically, to amend "two Acts of
Congress by repealing a portion of each,"'" thereby circumventing the
procedure for enacting legislation prescribed by Article I of the Constitution.
The Court pointed out that "[t]here is no provision in the Constitution that
authorizes the President to enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes." 2 The
Constitution expressly envisions only two roles for the President in the
legislative process: (i) initiating and influencing legislative proposals" and
(ii) returning (normally referred to as "vetoing") a bill passed by both Houses
of Congress to which the President objects.8 4 Given the limited express role
of the President in the legislative process and the silence of the Constitution
"on the subject of unilateral Presidential action that either repeals or amends
part of duly enacted statutes," 5 the Court concluded that
[t]here are powerful reasons for construing constitutional silence on this profoundly
important issue as equivalent to express prohibition. The procedures governing the
enactment of statutes set forth in the text of Article I were the product of the great
debates and compromises that produced the Constitution itself. Familiar historical
materials provide abundant support for the conclusion that the power to enact statutes
may only "be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively

considered, procedure." ... What has emerged in these cases from the President's
exercise of his statutory cancellation powers, however, are truncated versions oftwo bills
that passed both Houses of Congress. They are not the product of the "finely wrought"
procedure that the Framers designed."'

Thus, in reaching its decision in Clinton, the Court first turned its
attention to ascertaining the true nature of the power that had been granted to
the President by the Line Item Veto Act. Once the Court concluded that the
President had been granted the power to amend Acts of Congress, the Court
then examined the Constitution to determine whether the President had been
expressly granted such a power. Finding no such express grant of power and
further finding that the President had been expressly granted only a limited

80. Id at 447-49.
81. Id. at438.
82. Id
83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl.
2.

85. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 439.
86. Id.at 439-40 (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951
(1983)) (citation omitted).
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role in the legislative process, the Court held that the constitutional silence on
this question should be construed as equivalent to an express prohibition of
a power to amend, because legislation may only be enacted or amended in
accordance with the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
procedure" established by the framers.
The Argument
Adopting this analytical framework as a guide, the remainder of this
essay is devoted to the development of an argument that Congress lacks the
power to enact legislative overrides. First, the nature of the power granted to
Congress under the later-in-time rule is considered. Concluding that the laterin-time rule grants Congress, in essence, a power to amend treaties, the text
of the Constitution is then examined to determine whether Congress has been
expressly granted such a power. Finding no such express grant of power and
recalling the limited express role granted to Congress in the treaty-making
process, historical materials are next examined in an effort to establish that the
silence of the Constitution on this question should be construed as equivalent
to express prohibition because the framers intended the power to make and
amend treaties to be exercised in accordance with the "single, finely wrought
and exhaustively considered, procedure" prescribed by the Treaty Clause. 7
The Nature of Legislative Overrides
The first step in the Clinton analysis is to ascertain the true nature of the
power at issue, which, in this case, is the power to enact legislative overrides.
Similar to the President's power to cancel certain items pursuant to the Line
Item Veto Act, Congress' power to pass legislation that supersedes
inconsistent provisions in tax treaties has the practical and legal effect of

87. Id. This argument should not present anon.justiciable political question. See Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) ("[lI]t is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign
relations lies beyond judicial cognizance."); Michael J. Glennon, Foreign Affairs and the Political
Question Doctrine,in FOREIGN AFFAIRS ANDTHE U.S. CONSTITUTION 107, 112 (Louis Henkin et al. eds.,
1990) ("The purported merits ofjudicial abstention in foreign affairs decision-making disputes thus shrink

under scrutiny, while the drawbacks ... are substantial."). Judicial abstention isno more warranted in this
case than it was in Immigration& NaturalizationService v. Chadha. In Chadha, the Court rejected the
application of the political question doctrine, indicating that none of the factors identified in Bakery. Carr
were applicable and stating that "[n]o policy underlying the political question doctrine suggests that
Congress or the Executive, or both acting in concert and in compliance with Art. I, can decide the
constitutionality of a statute; that is a decision for the courts." 462 U.S. 919, 941-42 (1983).
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amending those treaties. By way of example, consider the effect of the
enactment of § 59(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code on article XXIV(4) of
the income tax treaty concluded between the United States and Canada."8
Article XXIV(4) of the U.S.-Canada Income Tax Treaty, which entered into
force in 1984, provides in pertinent part that "[w]here a United States citizen
is a resident of Canada, the following rules shall apply: . ..(b) For the
purposes of computing the United States tax, the United States shall allow as
a credit against United States tax the income tax paid or accrued to Canada
...."9 This provision plainly requires the United States to allow each U.S.
citizen who is residing in Canada a credit against her U.S. federal income tax
liability equal to the entire amount of Canadian tax that she has paid.90
In 1986, Congress enacted § 59(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code,9'
which limits the amount of foreign taxes that a taxpayer can credit against her
U.S. alternative minimum tax liability.' Section 59(a)(2) caps the amount of
the taxpayer's foreign tax credit for alternative minimum tax purposes at an
amount equal to 90% of the taxpayer's alternative minimum tax liability.
Section 59(a)(2) is designed to:ensure that all U.S. citizens residing abroad
will pay some tax to the United States, even if the amount of creditable
foreign taxes paid by them exceeds the amount of their U.S. alternative
minimum tax liability.93 Thus, to the extent of her alternative minimum tax
liability, a U.S. citizen residing in Canada (where the top marginal income tax
rate exceeds the rate at which the U.S. alternative minimum tax is imposed)

88. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with
Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, Sept. 26, 1980, U.S.-Can., art. XXIV, para. 4, S.ExEc. Doc.
T, 96-2, at 22 (1991) [hereinafter U.S.-Canada Income Tax Treaty].
89. Id.(emphasis added).
90. The saving clause in the U.S.-Canada Income Tax Treaty, which would normally permit the
United States to tax its citizens as if the treaty had never entered into force, does not apply to article XXIV.
para. 1,S. TREATY DOC. No. 98-22, at 1 (1984); id.Protocol, art. 17, para. 1, S.
Id. Protocol, art. I1,
TREATY Doc. No. 104-4, at 17-18 (1995).

91. Tax Reform Act of1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 701, 100 Stat. 2085, 2337 (1986).
92. The alternative minimum tax, which is computed at a lower rate than the highest regular income
tax rate but with respect to a broader tax base than that used for regular income tax purposes, is intended
as a "means of ensuring that every taxpayer with substantial economic income pays meaningful amounts
of tax, regardless of how many tax incentives and other special allowances the taxpayer might utilize."
4 BORRiS I. BITTKER& LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES & GIFTs 1111.4.1,
at 111-88 (2d ed. 1992). The alternative minimum tax was enacted in response to reports of high-income
individuals who were paying little or no income tax due to the "extensive use of allowances authorized
by the Code." Id. Its enactment was intended to forestall a loss of confidence in the fairness of the income
tax system, which could make it more difficult to collect taxes. Id.at 111-89.
93.

S.REP. No. 99-313, at 537 (1986).
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would be subject to double taxation (i.e., taxation by the United States and
Canada on the same income).
One might naturally assume that the double taxation caused by § 59(a)(2)
would be just the sort of impediment to the cross-border flow of capital and
labor targeted by the U.S. and Canadian governments when they drafted
article XXIV(4) of the U.S.-Canada Income Tax Treaty. Nevertheless,
because § 59(aX2) was enacted by Congress in 1986, some two years after the
U.S.-Canada Income Tax Treaty entered into force, it has been held that
§ 59(a)(2) overrides article XXIV(4), resulting in the double taxation of a
portion of the income of a U.S. citizen residing in Canada." Thus, by
enacting § 59(a)(2), Congress has effectively amended article XXIV(4) to
provide as follows:
"Where a United States citizen is a resident of Canada, the following rules shall apply:
(b)

For the purposes of computing the United States tax, the United States shall allow
as a credit against United States tax the income tax paid or accrued to Canada ....
except that,for purposesof the UnitedStates alternativeminimum tax, the credit
shall not exceed 90% of the United States alternativeminimum tax liability."

94. Jamieson v. Commissioner, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 1372 (1995), affid, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS
34,551 (D.C. Cir. 1997). See also Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-647, § 101 2(aa)(2)(B), (4), 102 Stat. 3342,3531-32 (1988) (expressly providing that § 59(a) will apply
"notwithstanding any treaty obligation of the United States in effect on the date of the enactment" of the
Tax Reform Act of 1986).
95. U.S.-Canada Income Tax Treaty, supra note 88, art. XXIV, para. 4,S. ExEc. Doc. T, 96-2, at
22 (emphasized text not in original). Even though Congress effectively amended article XXIV(4) when
it enacted § 59(a)(2), the original obligation embodied inarticle XXIV(4) continues to have legal effect
forpurposes ofintemational law. RESTATEmENT(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELAToNs LAW § 115(l)(b) (1986)
("That a rule of international law or a provision of an international agreement is superseded as domestic
law does not relieve the United States of its international obligation or of the consequences of a violation
ofthat obligation."). The existence ofthis continuing obligation under international law will not, however,
serve as a basis for arguing that Congress did not actually amend article XXIV(4). In Clinton, the Supreme
Court rejected a similar argument that no repeal of the cancelled provisions had occurred because the
cancelled provisions continued to have budgetary effect under the "lockbox" provisions of the Line Item
Veto Act:
That a canceled item may have "real, legal budgetary effect" as a result of the lockbox procedure
does not change the fact that by canceling the items at issue.., the President made them entirely
inoperative as to appellees. Section 968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act no longer provide[d] a tax
benefit, and § 4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 no longer relieve[d] New York of its
contingent liability.
Clinton, 524 U.S. at 441. In the instant situation, the application of article XXIV(4) to our U.S. citizen
residing in Canada has similarly been limited, with the result that she now owes a tax to the United States
that she would not have been required to pay had § 59(a)(2) never been enacted. Accordingly,
notwithstanding the United States' continuing obligation under international law, Congress will be treated
as having amended a treaty obligation of the United States when it enacted § 59(a)(2).
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ConstitutionalSilence on CongressionalPower to Amend Treaties
The next step in the Clinton analysis is to examine the Constitution to
determine whether Congress has been expressly granted the power to amend
treaties. As explained above, the express role of Congress in the treatymaking process is rather limited: the Senate is confined to reviewing and
approving treaties after their negotiation has been completed, and the House
is effectively foreclosed from playing any role in the treaty-making process.'
The Constitution is, therefore, silent on the subject of Congress' ability to
amend treaties. Following the Court's line of reasoning in Clinton, in light of
the limited express role granted to Congress in the treaty-making process, this
constitutional silence should be construed "as equivalent to express
prohibition. 97 The same powerful reasons that militated in favor of this
conclusion in Clinton should hold sway in this situation as well: first, the
Treaty Clause, like the Article I procedures for enacting statutes at issue in
Clinton,was "the product of the great debates and compromises that produced
the Constitution itself,"" and second, as elucidated below, "[flamiliar
historical materials provide abundant support for the conclusion"9 that the
framers intended the power to make and amend treaties to be exercised in
accordance with the "'single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
'
procedure""
prescribed by the Treaty Clause.
Debates at the FederalConvention of1787
The best historical evidence of the "finely wrought" and "exhaustively
considered" nature of the Treaty Clause is found in the record of the debates
at the Federal Convention of 1787. After working through procedural issues,
the delegates to the Federal Convention began their work on May 29, 1787.
The first concrete proposal for structuring the treaty power was made a few

96.
97.

See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
Clinton, 524 U.S. at 439.

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 439-40 (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951
(1983)). It is worth noting at the outset of this discussion that the framers were not unfamiliar with treaties

that touched on matters of taxation; under the Articles of Confederation, the United States concluded
several treaties of commerce that granted "[m]ost-favored-nation treatment in respect of... imposts and
duties." SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATES: THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT § 20, at 32-33 (1916).
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weeks later on June 18, when Alexander Hamilton offered his "sketch of a
plan" for a federal government. Hamilton's plan was offered to address
perceived deficiencies in the Virginia and New Jersey plans that were then
being debated by the delegates to the convention. Under his plan, Hamilton
proposed to vest the power to make treaties in the President, whom Hamilton
referred to as the "Governour," with the "advice and approbation" of the
Senate.'
Hamilton's plan was not intended "as a proposition to the
Committee," but rather was offered "to give a more correct view of his
ideas."' 2 Accordingly, although Hamilton's plan was recorded in the notes
of several of the delegates to the Federal Convention, "his plan was never the
subject of a formal debate."' 3
As Professor Arthur Bestor has pointed out, by the time that Hamilton
presented his plan for a federal government, "the question of the nature and
scope of executive power was already being pushed aside by a developing
crisis over representation." °0 It was not until the acceptance of the Great
Compromise on representation on July 17 that the delegates were "able to turn
[their] attention back to broader questions of constitutional structure and
power."'0 5 Matters proceeded quickly, and, by late July 1787, a Committee
of Detail was charged with drafting a Constitution that embodied the
resolutions passed by the delegates during the preceding two months of
debate." ° These resolutions "set forth various major principles of political
organization, together with a few specifications ofthe powers to be exercised
by the several contemplated governmental organs.' 0 7
On August 6, the Committee of Detail reported a draft of the
Constitution. This draft was then discussed clause by clause, the Treaty
Clause not being reached until August 23. In this draft, the power to make
treaties was vested in the Senate alone, and the Senate was permitted to make
treaties by majority vote."0 8 It had apparently been the "tacit assumption of

101. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENnON OF 1787, at 292 (Max Farrand ed., 1937)
[hereinafter RECORDS].
102. Id.at 291.
103. Arthur Bestor, "Advice "from the Very Beginning, "Consent" when the End Is Achieved, in
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 6, 10 (Louis Henkin et a].
eds., 1990).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id; I RECORDS, supranote 101, at xxii; 2 RECORDS, supranote 101, at 95-96, 129-33.
107. Arthur Bestor, Respective Roles of Senate and Presidentin the Making and Abrogation of
Treaties-TheOriginalIntent ofthe Framersofthe ConstitutionHistoricallyExamined,55 WASH. L. REv.
1,82 (1979).
108. 2 RECORDS, supra note 101, at 183.
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most delegates, once the principle was accepted that two Houses should be
constituted in place of the old unicameral Congress of the Confederation,"'"
that the power to make treaties would be vested in the Senate. It was not,
however, until this "tacit assumption" appeared in the August 6 report of the
Committee of Detail that the framers realized its impact on the Great
Compromise on representation."' The Great Compromise had "struck a
reasonable balance between [the] competing interests""' of the smaller and
larger states with regard to domestic lawmaking; however, by vesting the
exclusive control over the power to make treaties in the Senate, "a significant
moiety of the intended compromise was in fact non-existent"" 2 because "[the
larger states would not have the weight to which they felt entitled when it
came to the making both of commercial treaties and of agreements regarding
territory and other rights."" 3
This issue was first raised even before the formal debate on the Treaty
Clause began. During a discussion of the Origination Clause'", on August 15,
George Mason voiced concern over the ability of the Senate to cede territory
by treaty, indicating his firm commitment to deprive the Senate of the power
to originate spending and appropriations bills because it "could already sell
the whole Country by means of Treaties.""' John Francis Mercer agreed with
Mason, commenting that the treaty power should be vested in the executive
department rather than the legislative. Mercer also addressed the absence of
the House of Representatives from the treaty-making process when he
asserted that treaties should "not be final so as to alter the laws of the land, till
ratified by legislative authority.""' 6
On August 23, the delegates began to debate the Treaty Clause itself. At
the start of this debate, James Madison broached the subject of presidential
participation in the treaty-making process when he proposed that "the
President should be an agent in Treaties" because the Senate "represented the
States alone.""' Gouverneur Morris also questioned whether the treaty power
should be vested in the Senate, and further raised "an issue that was genuinely

109. Bestor, supra note 107, at 93.
110. Id.at 94-95.

111. Id. at 94.
112. Id.at 94-95.
113. Id.at 95.
114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl.
I ("All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills.").
115. 2 REcoRDs, supranote 101, at 297.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 392.
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controversial, ....
the exclusion of the House of Representatives from the
treatymaking process and the placement of the treaty power in a body where
differences of size among the states counted for nothing.""' To address this
issue, Morris moved to amend the language proposed by the Committee of
Detail to provide that treaties would not be binding on the United States until
"ratified by a law."'" 9
Morris' motion, which kept the power to make treaties in the hands of the
Senate but required the concurrence of the House of Representatives,
engendered considerable debate among the framers. Madison indicated that
requiring treaties to be ratified by a law would be inconvenient in the case of
treaties of alliance.2 0 Nathaniel Gorham adverted to the "[m]any other
disadvantages" that would result from requiring treaties of peace to be ratified
by a law, including the fact that the treaty negotiators would "go abroad not
instructed by the same Authority (as will be the case with other Ministers)
which is to ratify their proceeding."'' Morris responded that he "was not
solicitous to multiply [and] facilitate Treaties." He also hoped that these
difficulties would force foreign nations to negotiate treaties of alliance in the
United States.'22 John Dickinson concurred with Morris' proposed
amendment, but recognized that "it was unfavorable to the little States,"
which "would otherwise have an equal share in making Treaties."' 23 James
Wilson suggested that Morris' proposed amendment was no different than the
procedure in Great Britain, where the King was "obliged to resort to
Parliament for the execution of [the most important Treaties]."' 24 William
Samuel Johnson, however, disputed Wilson's statement, asserting that full and
complete power to make treaties was vested in the King. 2 ' At the close of
this debate, Morris' motion to require treaties to be ratified by a law was
defeated by a vote of 8 to 1, with one state being divided on the question. 26
Following the defeat of Morris' motion, James Madison "hinted for
consideration, whether a distinction might not be made between different sorts
of Treaties-Allowing the President [and] Senate to make Treaties eventual

118. Bestor, supra note 107, at 109.
119. 2 RECoRD, supra note 101, at 392.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.at 392-93.
123. Id.at 393.
124. Id.

125. Id.
126. Id.at 394.
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and of Alliance for limited terms-and requiring the concurrence of the whole
Legislature in other Treaties."' 27
Because ofthe disagreements among the delegates, the Treaty Clause was
referred to the Committee of Five,' and later, on August 3 1, was referred to
the Committee of Eleven, which had been charged with addressing the
postponed parts of the Constitution. 29 On September 4, the Committee of
Eleven presented its report, which proposed that "[t]he President by and with
the advice and Consent of the Senate, shall have power to make treaties ....
But no Treaty ... shall be made without the consent of two thirds of the
members present." 3 ° On September 7 and 8, the Committee of Eleven draft
of the Treaty Clause "was the subject of a protracted debate."''
As will be borne out by the summary below, this debate focused on two
issues: (i) whether to require both the House and Senate to consent to treaties
and (ii) whether to remove or alter the requirement that two-thirds of the
Senators present must consent to treaties.'
The debate concerning the
inclusion of the House of Representatives in the treaty-making process
reflected a resurgence of the conflict between the larger states and the smaller
states that had been resolved, insofar as domestic lawmaking was concerned,
by the Great Compromise on representation.' 33 The debate over the supermajority requirement was not, however, prompted by the conflict between the
larger and the smaller states, but rather by conflicting sectional economic
interests. 3 4 It represented "a confrontation between the southern states with
their plantation base and their extensive interests in western land, and the
maritime and commercial states of the north and east, small and large
alike.""' In fact, when the delegates met in Philadelphia, the wounds from a
bitter sectional conflict that had taken place the year before, involving
negotiations with Spain over a commercial treaty, were still fresh in their
36
minds.
On September 7, James Wilson moved to require both the House and
Senate to consent to treaties because, "[a]s treaties . . . are to have the

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 481.
Id. at 498-99.
CRANDALL, supra note 100, § 24, at 44.
BESTOR, supra note 107, at 123.
Id. at97.
Id. at 97-98.
Id. at97.
Id. at 97-98.
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operation of laws, they ought to have the sanction of laws also."" Roger
Sherman opposed this motion on the ground "that the necessity of secrecy ' in
38
the case of treaties forbade a reference of them to the whole Legislature."'
Wilson countered that the need for secrecy in negotiating treaties was
outweighed by the need for the legislative sanction of them.'39 Wilson's
motion was then brought to a vote, and was defeated by a margin of 10 to 1.140
Also on September 7, Wilson objected to the super-majority requirement
on the ground that it would "put[] it in the power of a minority to controul the
will of a majority."''
Rufus King concurred with Wilson's objection,
asserting that the participation of the President served as a check. 42 Madison
moved to except treaties of peace from the super-majority requirement, and
this motion was passed without opposition.'43 Hugh Williamson and Richard
Dobbs Spaight later moved that a treaty of peace affecting territorial rights
44
should be made only with the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate.
Madison further moved to permit "two thirds of the Senate to make
treaties of peace, without the concurrence of the President," because the
President "would necessarily derive so much power and importance from a
state of war that he might be tempted, if authorized, to impede a treaty of
peace."' 145 Pierce Butler seconded this motion "as a necessary security against
ambitious [and] corrupt Presidents." 46 Nathaniel Gorham thought Madison's
motion unnecessary, because "the means of carrying on war would not be in
the hands of the President, but of the Legislature."' 47 Gouverneur Morris also
disagreed with Madison's motion, believing that "no peace ought to be made
without the concurrence of the President." 48 Elbridge Gerry thought that

treaties of peace should actually require a higher threshold for approval than
other treaties, because "[i]n Treaties of peace the dearest interests will be at
stake, as the fisheries, territory &c.' 49 Madison's motion to permit two-thirds

137. 2 REcoRDs, supra note 101, at 538.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 540.
142. Id.

143. Id.
144. id. at 543.
145. Id at 540.
146. Id at 540-41.

147. Id. at 540.
148. Id. at 541.

149. Id.
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of the Senate to make treaties of peace without the concurrence of the
President was defeated by a vote of 8 to 3V5

On September 8, 1787, Rufus King moved to strike from the supermajority requirement the "exception of Treaties of peace" language that had
been added on Madison's motion during the prior day's debate."' Wilson
then moved to strike out the super-majority requirement altogether, because
"[i]f the majority cannot be trusted, it was a proof... that we were not fit for
one Society."' After these two motions were made, "[a] reconsideration of
the whole clause was agreed to.""'
Gouverneur Morris opposed King's motion on the grounds that (i) if twothirds of the Senate is required to make peace, the legislature "will be
unwilling to make war,"' 54 and (ii) ifa majority of the Senate wishes to make
peace and is not permitted to, "they will be apt to effect their purpose in the
more disagreeable mode, of negativing the supplies for the war.'" 55
Williamson voiced some concern that treaties would be made in the branch
of government "where there may be a majority of the States without a
majority of the people."' 56 Wilson also remarked that if two-thirds of the
Senate were necessary to make peace, a minority could perpetuate war."
Gerry "enlarged on the danger of putting the essential rights of the Union in
the hands of so small a number as a majority of the Senate, representing
perhaps, not one fifth of the people."'5 Roger Sherman moved that no rights
established by a treaty of peace should "be ceded without the sanction of the
6°
Legislature."' 59 Morris seconded Sherman's motion
King's motion to strike the "except Treaties of peace" language from the
super-majority requirement passed by a vote of 8 to 3.I6 Wilson's motion to
strike the super-majority requirement was defeated by a vote of 9 to 1, with
one state being divided.'62 A number of other motions were also made on that
day:
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id. at 547.
Id. at 547-48.
Id. at 548.
Id.
Id.
ld.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 548-49.
Id.at 549.
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" John Rutledge and Elbridge Gerry moved to require the consent of two-thirds of all

of the members of the Senate, rather than two-thirds of the members present (as
proposed by the Committee of Eleven)." 3 This motion was defeated by a vote of 8
to 3 .I

"

Roger Sherman moved "that 'no Treaty be made without a Majority of the whole
number <of the Senate>," and Elbridge Gerry seconded his motion. 65 Hugh
Williamson argued that this amendment provided "less security than 2/3," but
Sherman countered that it would "be less embarrassing."'" Sherman's motion was
defeated by a vote of 6 to 5.67

* James Madison moved "that a Quorum of the Senate consist of 2/3 of all the
members," which would have "put it in the power of one man to break up a
Quorum."'' This motion was also defeated by a vote of 6 to 5.'"
• Hugh Williamson and Elbridge Gerry moved that no treaty should be made without
prior notice to the members of the Senate and a reasonable time for their
attendance.' 7" This motion was defeated by a vote of 8 to 3.

Following this lengthy debate, the Treaty Clause, as reported by the
Committee of Eleven on September 4, was approved by a vote of 8 to 3, with
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Georgia opposed.' The Treaty Clause was
then sent to the Committee of Style, which had been charged with arranging
and polishing the various provisions that had been approved by the delegates
during the preceding month."7 The Treaty Clause emerged from the
Committee of Style "with some reordering of its phrases, and on the 15th of
September the Convention loaded it down with additional details relating to
appointments." 7 3 On September 17, the U.S. Constitution "was laid before
the Convention, agreed to, and signed." 74 The Treaty Clause was "frequently
the topic of debate" " during the state ratifying conventions, and was the
subject of a number of amendments proposed during the ratification process,
none of which was ultimately adopted.

163. Id.
164. Id.

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id (alteration inoriginal).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

170. Id. at 549-50.
171. Id. at 550.

172. Bestor, supra note 107, at 131.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 131-32.
175. CRANDALL, supra note

100, § 31, at 56. See also 3 STORY,

supra note 49,

§ 1508.
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The Federalist: Explaining andJustifying the Treaty Clause
Further historical support for the argument that the Treaty Clause was
"finely wrought" and "exhaustively considered" by the framers can be found
in the detailed explanation and justification of the Treaty Clause set forth in
The Federalist.In The FederalistNo. 64, John Jay described the treaty power
and the manner in which it should be vested as follows:
The power of making treaties is an important one, especially as it relates to war, peace
and commerce; and it should not be delegated but in such a mode, and with such
precautions, as will afford the highest security, that it will be exercised by men the6best
qualified for the purpose, and in the manner most conducive to the public good. "

explained that the treaty power had properly been vested in the President
and Senate because the manner of their selection " and the age restrictions
imposed on their offices should produce candidates of"whom the people have
had time to form ajudgment, and with respect to whom they will not be liable
to be deceived by those brilliant appearances of genius and patriotism, which
like transient meteors sometimes mislead as well as dazzle."'7 8 Thus, "the
president and senators.. . will always be of the number of those who best
understand our national interests . . . and whose reputation for integrity
Jay

176. THE FEDE.RALIST No. 64, at 432 (John Jay) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) [hereinafter THE
FEDERALIST NO. 64].

177. Originally, neither the President nor Senators were to be directly elected by the people. The
President was "to be chosen by select bodies of electors to be deputed by the people for that express
purpose," and the appointment of Senators was to be made by the state legislatures. Id. While the
President continues to be chosen by electors, the Seventeenth Amendment altered the manner in which
Senators are chosen. Senators are now directly elected by the people. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, cl.
i.
While the change in the manner in which Senators are chosen may, to a certain extent, undermine the
rationale set forth in The FederalistNo. 64 for vesting the treaty power in the Senate and President, this
change is irrelevant to the instant discussion because it came some 125 years after the Constitution was
drafted and submitted to the states for ratification. The focus here is on whether the Treaty Clause was
"finely wrought" and "exhaustively considered" by the framers, not on whether the facts supporting their
rationale for the structure of the Treaty Clause remain unchanged today. See Laurence H.Tribe, Taking
Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-FormMethod in ConstitutionalInterpretation, 108

HARV. L. REv. 1221, 1247 (1995) ("Those provisions of the Constitution that are manifestly instrumental
and means-oriented and that frame the architecture of the government ought to be given as fixed and
determinate a reading as possible-one whose meaning is essentially frozen in time insofar as the shape,
or topology, of the institutions created is concerned.").
178. THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, supranote 176, at 433.
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inspires and merits confidence. With such men the power of making treaties
may be safely lodged."'"
Jay also explained that by vesting the power of negotiating treaties
primarily in the President, "he will be able to manage the business of
intelligence in such manner as prudence may suggest,"' 0 because the
negotiation of treaties sometimes requires "perfect secrecy and immediate
dispatch."'' Having the Senate participate in the treaty-making process
assures "that the affairs of trade and navigation [will] be regulated by a system
cautiously formed and steadily pursued."' 82 Thus, Jay concluded that the
Treaty Clause ensures "that our negociations for treaties shall have every
advantage which can be derived from talents, information, integrity, and
deliberate investigations on the one hand, and from secrecy and dispatch on
the other."' 83 In The FederalistNo. 75, Alexander Hamilton concurred with
this view, and concluded that "the joint possession of the power in question
by the president and senate would afford a greater prospect of security, than
the separate possession of it by either of them."' "
Jay justified the omission of the House of Representatives from the
treaty-making process on the ground that it is a popular assembly whose
members are "constantly coming and going in quick succession" '85 and,
therefore, do not continue in office for "sufficient time to become perfectly
acquainted with our national concerns, and to form and introduce a system for
the management of them."' 86 The term of office of a Senator is considerably
longer than that of a Representative (six years versus two),I87 thereby giving
Senators "an opportunity of greatly extending their political informations and
of rendering their accumulating experience more and more beneficial to their
country."'88 Furthermore, the staggering of senatorial elections "obviate[s]
the inconvenience of periodically transferring those great affairs entirely to
new men, for by leaving a considerable residue of the old ones in place,
uniformity and order, as well as a constant succession of official information,

179. Id.
180. Id.
at 435.
181. Id at434.
182. Id.
183. Id.at 436.
184. THE FEDERALISTNO. 75, at 506 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) [hereinafter
THE FEDERALIST No. 751.
185. THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, supra note 176, at 433-34.
186. Id.at 434.
187. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl.
1;U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl.
I(amended 1913).
188. THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, supra note 176, at 434.
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will be preserved." 89 In The FederalistNo. 75, Alexander Hamilton echoed
Jay's defense of the omission of the House of Representatives from the treatymaking process:
The remarks made in [The Federalist No. 64] will apply with conclusive force against
the admission of the house of representatives to a share in the formation of treaties. The
fluctuating, and taking its future increase into the account, the multitudinous composition
of that body, forbid us to expect in it those qualities which are essential to the proper
execution of such a trust. Accurate and comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics;
a steady and systematic adherence to the same views; a nice and uniform sensibility to
national character, decision, secrecy and dispatch; are incompatible with the genius of
a body so variable and so numerous. The very complication of the business by
introducing a necessity of the concurrence of so many different bodies, would of itself
afford a solid objection. The greater frequency of the calls upon the house of
representatives, and the greater length of time which it would often be necessary to keep
them together when convened, to obtain their sanction in the progressive stages of a
treaty, would be source of so great inconvenience and expence, as alone ought to
condemn the project.'"

A Single, Finely Wrought and Exhaustively Considered,Procedure
Thus, the records of the Federal Convention, along with the explanation
in The Federalistof the plan of government forged during that convention,
provide "abundant support for the conclusion"19 that the framers intended the
power to make treaties to be exercised in accordance with the "'single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure"" 92 prescribed by the Treaty

189. Id.
190. THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, supra note 184, at 506-07.

191. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 439.
192. Id.at 43940 (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951
(1983)). The finely wrought and exhaustively considered procedure prescribed by the Treaty Clause
represents the "single" procedure found in the Constitution for making a treaty. HENKIN, supra note 49,
at 173. During the first 150 years ofour republic, this procedure was viewed as the exclusive method for
entering into treaties. Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?,108 HARV. L. REV.
799, 808-13 (1995). It was not until the mid-twentieth century that the congressional-executive agreement
came to be accepted, in practice, as an alternative to agreements concluded pursuant to the Treaty Clause.
Despite its acceptance in practice, the constitutionality of the congressional-executive agreement remains
hotly debated. Compare Ackerman, supra, with Tribe, supra note 177. See also Made in the USA Found.
v. United States, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (N.D. Ala. 1999) (finding NAFTA constitutional, despite the fact
that its conclusion did not comply with the requirements of the Treaty Clause), vacated and case ordered
dismissed,242 F.3d 1300 (11 th Cir. 2001) (vacating the district court decision and dismissing the case on
the ground that determining whether an international commercial agreement--such as NAFTA-is a
"treaty" presents a non-justiciable political question), petition for cert.filed, 70 U.S.L.W. 3074 (U.S.
June 28, 2001) (No. 01-5). Given the questionable constitutionality of the congressional-executive
agreement and, more importantly, its recent vintage, the existence of this alternative method for making
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Clause.'93 Much in the same way that the amendment or repeal of a statute
must conform with the Article I procedures for enacting a statute, 194 the
amendment of a treaty should also conform with the "single, finely wrought
and exhaustively considered, procedure" prescribed by the Treaty Clause for
making treaties. While certain of the founders may have disagreed with this
proposition (because of their belief that the Constitution would not render
treaties binding on Congress'95), John Jay effectively refuted their contrary
interpretation and supported the reasonableness of this proposition in the
following passage from The FederalistNo. 64:
Others, though content that treaties should be made in the mode proposed, are averse to
their being the SUPREME laws of the land. They insist, and profess to believe, that
treaties like acts of assembly, should be repealable at pleasure. This idea seems to be
new and peculiar to this country, but new errors as well as new truths often appear.
These gentlemen would do well to reflect that a treaty is only another name for a bargain;
and that it would be impossible to find a nation who would make any bargain with us,
which should be binding on them ABSOLUTELY, but on us only so long and sofar as
we may think proper to be bound by it. They who make laws may without doubt amend
or repeal them and it will not be disputed that they who make treaties may alter or cancel

them; but still let us not forget that treaties are made not by only one of the contracting
parties, but by both, and consequently that as the consent of both was essential to their
formation at first, so must it ever afterwards be to alter or cancel them. The proposed
Constitution therefore has not in the least extended the obligation of treaties. They are
just as binding, andjust as far beyond the lawful reach oflegislative acts now, as they
will be at any future period, or under any form ofgovernment. "'

In this passage, Jay not only dispels any notion that Congress has the power
under the Constitution to enact legislation that overrides treaties, but also

international agreements should not undercut the argument that familiar historical materials provide
abundant support for the conclusion that the framers intended the power to make treaties to be exercised
in accordance with the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure" prescribed by the
Treaty Clause.
193. It is not surprising that the framers would have devoted a considerable amount of time and
thought to treaty-related issues, because problems encountered under the Articles of Confederation in
enforcing treaties were an impetus for calling the Federal Convention. See I REcORDS, supra note 101,
at 18-19; CRANDALL, supra note 100, § 29, at 51; THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 136-44 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
194. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983).
195. See, e.g., 3 JoHN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 510, 515 (2d ed. 1996) (statements of Mr. Corbin and James
Madison).
196. THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, supra note 176, at 436-37 (emphasis added). See also 4 ELLIOTT,
supra note 195, at 119 (statement of Mr. Davie during the ratification debate in North Carolina indicating
that "[a]ll
civilized nations have concurred in considering [treaties] as paramount to an ordinary act of
legislation").
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warns of the danger inherent in granting such a power to Congress-a
warning whose prescience has been confirmed by our experience with
legislative overrides of tax treaties. 97
Jay's views concerning legislative overrides are consistent with the
framers' choice, after thorough debate and consideration, to vest the treaty
power in the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. One of the
most contentious issues faced by the framers in structuring the Treaty Clause
was whether to require the consent of the entire Congress to proposed
treaties.'98 The records of the Federal Convention and The FederalistNos. 64
and 75 make clear that the framers decisively rejected any role for the House
of Representatives in the treaty-making process. As explicated in The
Federalist,the House was excluded from this process principally because its
fundamental characteristics (e.g., its greater number, shorter term of office,
and frequent turnover) were considered inimical to the formation of consistent
policies that take into account the national interest. 99
The later-in-time rule upsets this careful balance of power. First, the
later-in-time rule permits the House of Representatives to play a role in the
"amendment" of treaties, even though it was allocated no role in their
formation; however, the considerations that militated against granting the
House a role in the formation of treaties are no less present when treaties are
"amended." In fact, one might convincingly argue that the case for excluding
the House of Representatives from the "amendment" process is even more
compelling because of the unilateral nature of that process. Second, in the
case of tax treaties, the later-in-time rule not only injects the House into the
"amendment" process, but also accords it de facto primacy in that process
because the Origination Clause requires all bills that raise revenue to originate
in the House of Representatives. 2" Finally, if a super-majority of each House
can be mustered, Congress can "amend" a treaty even in the face of opposition
from the President, because Congress has the power to override a presidential
veto of legislation that it enacts.2"'
Jay's views concerning legislative overrides are also consistent with the
writings of Grotius, Vattel, Burlamaqui, and Pufendorf, all of whom
influenced the thinking of the framers in the area of international law.20 2

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

See supranote 61 and accompanying text.
Bestor, supra note 103, at 7, 11-12.
See supratext accompanying notes 185-90.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.

202. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 22-54
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These writers acknowledged the important role that treaties play in
international law, and stressed the sanctity and inviolability of a nation's
treaty obligations. This core principle of international law, as explicated by
Grotius, Vattel, Burlamaqui, and Pufendorf, simply cannot be reconciled with
granting a power to Congress that would permit it unilaterally to alter (i.e.,
breach) the obligations undertaken in a treaty.
Hugo Grotius, who has been described as "the founder of modem
international law,''2° expounded "the most basic and indispensable governing
principle of the law of nations, ' 201 namely pacta sunt servanda [agreements
must be kept].2 °5 Samuel Pufendorf generally addressed the importance of
this principle in the following passage:
[W]henever men enter into any agreements, the social nature of man requires that they
must be faithfully observed. For if an agreement lacks this guarantee, much the largest
part of the advantage which accrues to mankind from the mutual interchange of duties
would be lost.... It is, therefore, a most sacred precept of natural law, and one that
governs the grace, manner, and reasonableness of all human life, That every man keep
his given word, that is, carry out his promises and agreements. 2"

Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui underscored the importance of the principle pacta
sunt servanda:
[S]overeigns are no less obliged, than individuals, inviolably to keep their word, and be
faithful to their engagements. The law of nations makes this an indispensable duty; for
it is evident, that were it otherwise, not only public treaties would be useless to nations,
but moreover, that the violation ofthese would throw them into a state of diffidence and
continual war; that is to say, into the most terrible situation. The obligation therefore of
sovereigns, in this respect, is so much the stronger, as the violation of this duty has more
dangerous consequences, which interest the happiness of numbers of individuals. The
sanctity of an oath, which generally accompanies public treaties, is an additional motive

(1967);

GORDON S.WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 355 (1969).
203. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, The Grotian Tradition in InternationalLaw, in 2 INTERNATIONAL
LAW: BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERCH LAUTERPACHT 307,325 (Elihu Lauterpacht ed., 1975).
See also 1 VERZUL, supranote 56, at 438 (describing Grotius as "the initiator of a real theory and system
of international law").
204. 1 VERZUL, supranote 56, at 244. See also LAuTERPACHT, supranote 203, at 325 (describing
the principle pactasunt servanda as "one of the cornerstones of Grotius' teaching").
205. See HuGoGRoTIus, DE JURE BELLI AC PAcis LIBRI TRES, Prolegomena §8; Prolegomena§ 15;
bk. 3, ch. 19, § 2, para. 2 (1646), translatedin THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2 DE JURE BELLI
AC PACIS LIBI TRES 13,14-15, 794 (James Brown Scott ed., 1925).
206. SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO bk. 3, ch. 4, § 2 (1688),
translatedin THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2 DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LiBRI OCTO

380-81 (James Brown Scott ed., 1934).
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to engage princes to observe them with the utmost fidelity ....The royal word ought
therefore to be inviolable and sacred." 7

Emmerich de Vattel described "[t]he question of treaties" as "one of the
most important presented by the mutual relations and intercourse of
Nations,"2 8 and asserted that a nation that makes a promise to another has
conferred "a valid right to require the thing promised."2 According to
Vattel, respecting the rights ofothers, including rights created by the promises
embodied in treaties, is "[t]he basis of peace, welfare, and safety of the human
race"; thus, if nations were not to respect their word "[t]here would be no
longer any security among men, nor any intercourse possible."' 0 For these
reasons, Vattel concluded that "[n]ations and
their rulers should... observe
' '21
their promises and their treaties inviolably.
Due to the importance of a nation's obligation to keep its promises, "not
only to the contracting parties but also to all Nations as members of the
universal society of mankind," Vattel dedicated an entire chapter in Le Droit
des Gens, ou Principesde la Loi Naturelle to the exploration of "The Faith of

Treaties." 1 In this chapter, Vattel emphasized the "sacred and inviolable"2"3
nature of treaties, and described a nation that shows contempt for treaties, that
"violates them and treads them under foot," as a "public enemy" with respect
to whom all other nations should "unite together to check."214 Nevertheless,
given the seriousness of the matter, Vattel warned that one should not lightly
conclude that a nation that breaks its treaties "despises their binding force";

207. JEAN-JACQUES BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITIC LAW: BEING A SEQUEL TO THE

PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW pt. 4, ch. 9, § 3, at 315 (Mr. Nugent trans., 1752). See also idpt. I, ch. 1,
§ 13, at 5 ("the law ofnature ... commands us to be faithful to our engagements").
208. EMMERICH DE VATrEL, LE DRoIT DES GENS, OU PRINCIPES DE LA Loi NATURELLE, APPLIQU.S

ALA CONDUITE AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES SOUVERAINS bk. 2, ch. 12, § 152 (1758), translated
in THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 3 LE DROIT DES GENS, OU PRINCIPES DE LA Loi NATURELLE,

APPLIQUts ALA CONDUITE AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES SOUVERAINS 160 (James Brown Scott ed.,
1916).
209. Id. § 163, translated in THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 3 LE DROIT DES GENS, OU
PRINCIPES DE LA Loi NATURELLE, APPLIQUtS A LA CONDUITE AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES

SOUVERAINs 162 (James Brown Scott ed., 1916).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.bk. 2, ch. 15, § 218, translated in THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 3 LE DROIT DES
GENs, OU PRINCIPES DE LA Loi NATURELLE, APPLIQUtS A LA CONDUITE AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET

DES SOUVERAINS 188-92 (James Brown Scott ed., 1916).
213. Id.§ 222, translated In THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 3 LE DROIT DES GENS, OU
PRINCIPES DE LA LoI NATURELLE, APPLIQUtS A LA CONDUITE AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES

SOUVERAiNS 188 (James Brown Scott ed., 1916).
214. Id.
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rather, "[i]t is the sovereign who fails to keep his promises on clearly trivial
grounds, or who does not even take the trouble to offer reasons, or to disguise
his conduct and cover up his bad faith-it is he who deserves to be treated as

2 15
an enemy of the human race."
The notion that a contracting state may not unilaterally alter its treaty
obligations is but a corollary of the principle that treaty obligations should be
kept sacred and inviolable. The need for mutual consent is implicit in the
writings of Grotius, Pufendorf, and Vattel. In his text, Grotius addressed the
effect of conflicting agreements between the same parties as follows:

In case the contradiction is real, a later agreement between the contracting parties will
annul earlier agreements, since no one could at the same time have had contradictory
desires. Such is in truth the nature of acts dependent on the will that they can be
relinquished through a new act of volition, either 'on the one part', as in a law or a will,
or conjointly, as in the case of contracts and compacts." 6

It is of particular interest that, in articulating this rule, Grotius made a clear
distinction between laws and wills, which can be unilaterally altered, and
contracts and compacts, which can only be altered "conjointly" (i.e., through
the mutual consent of the parties). In his exposition of the rules applicable to
the interpretation of pacts, Pufendorf, "following almost . . . [in the very
footsteps] of Grotius, 2 7 adopted this same distinction. In his discussion of
the rules applicable to conflicts among laws and among treaties, Vattel posited

conflicts between two laws and between two treaties, but, in the course of
articulating ten separate rules applicable to such conflicts, notably made no
mention of the rules applicable to conflicts between laws and treaties." 8

Additionally, in a separate chapter on the manner in which treaties may
be dissolved, Vattel discussed only two grounds for dissolution: (i) violation

215. Id. at 188-89.
216. GROT1US, supra note 205, bk. 2, ch. 16, § 4, para. 1, translated in THE CLASSICS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2 DE JURE BELLI AC PAcIs LiBRI TRES 411 (James Brown Scott ed., 1925).
217. PUFENDORF, supra note 206, bk. 5, ch. 12, § 6, translatedin THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, 2 DE JuRE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTo 793 (James Brown Scott ed., 1934) (alteration in

original).
218. VATTEL, supra note 208, bk. 2, ch. 17, §§ 311-22, translated in THE CLASSICS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw, 3 LE DROIT DES GENs, OU PRINCIPES DE LA Loi NATURELLE, APPLIQUIS A LA
CONDUITE AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES SoUVERAINS 218-21 (James Brown Scott ed., 1916). One
of the ten rules articulated by Vattel is that a later treaty will supersede an earlier treaty, but his explication
of this rule does not contemplate its application to a conflict between a law and a treaty. Id. § 315,
translatedin THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 3 LE DROIT DES GENS, OU PRINCIPES DE LA LOI
NATURELLE, APPLIQUtS ALA CONDUITE AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES SoUVERAINS 219-20 (James
Brown Scott ed., 1916).
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by the other contracting party and (ii) mutual consent."1 9 Similarly, in
discussing the means by which obligations arising from pacts may be met,
Pufendorf mentioned three grounds for release from an obligation: (i) breach
by the other contracting party, (ii) forgiveness by the other contracting party,
and (iii) mutual consent."' Grotius, in the context of discussing breaches of
peace treaties, made the following statement, which indicates that a
contracting state cannot unilaterally relieve itself of its treaty obligations:
Certainly even after a broken agreement it is within the power of the injured party to
preserve peace, as Scipio did after many treacherous acts of the Carthaginians; no one
frees himselffrom an obligation by acting contrary to it. And if the provision has been
added, that the treaty of peace should be considered broken by such an act, this provision
ought to be considered as added merely for the benefit of the innocent party, in case he
wishes to take advantage of it." 2

Neither Grotius, Pufendorf, nor Vattel appears to have contemplated the
unilateral, unprovoked modification, amendment, or dissolution of a treaty
obligation; instead, each appears to contemplate (as reported by John Jay in
The FederalistNo. 64) that such changes will be made only through the
mutual consent of the contracting states.
Thus, using the Supreme Court's rationale in Clinton as a guide, a strong
case can be made that Congress lacks the power to enact legislation that
overrides inconsistent provisions in tax treaties. The Constitution grants
Congress only a limited express role in the making of treaties, and is silent on
the question whether Congress has the power to override inconsistent
provisions in treaties through the passage of legislation. In accordance with
Clinton, this constitutional silence should be construed as equivalent to
express prohibition of a power to override treaties, because, as evidenced by
the historical materials discussed above, the Treaty Clause represents the
"single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure" established
by the framers for making and amending treaties.

219. Id. §§ 198-205, translatedin THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 3 LE DROIT DES GENS,
OU PRINCIPES DE LA Loi NATURELLE, APPLIQUtS A LA CONDUITE AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES
SOUvERAINS 176-79 (James Brown Scott ed., 1916).
220. PUFENDORF, supra note 206, bk. 5, ch. 11, §§ 7-9, translated in THE CLASSICS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2 DE JuRE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO 787-89 (James Brown Scott ed.,

1934).
221. GROTIUS, supranote 205, bk. 3, ch. 20, § 38, translatedin TIE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, 2 DE JURE BELLI AC PAaS LIBIU TRES 818 (James Brown Scott ed., 1925) (emphasis added).
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CONCLUSION

A strong, broad network of tax treaties is widely acknowledged to be an
important element of the overall international economic policy of the United
States. Congress has unfortunately done a great deal of damage to the
integrity of this network during the past quarter-century by enacting an
alarming amount of legislation that is intended to override inconsistent
provisions in tax treaties. Congress has enacted these legislative overrides
despite the vociferous, long-standing opposition of members of the executive
branch, our treaty partners, and commentators. I have framed this essay as a
call to action in the hope that, by urging commentators to redirect their
energies toward a cooperative effort with members of the tax bar, we may
finally achieve what nearly twenty-five years of pleading with Congress has
not: curtailing tax treaty overrides and restoring respect for our treaty
obligations and the treaty-making process.

